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Home > Kalakosa > Kalasamalocana > List of Books > In the Footsteps of Xuanzang > IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF XUANZANG: TAN YUN-SHAN AND INDIA |
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INDIA AND CHINA
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Whereas most nationalists
believe that there is a continuous history of the nation from ancient
times to the present, identifiable as the history of a self-same people,
scholars of nationalism, particularly in the last fifteen or so years,
have debunked all such notions of a continuous path as mythical. I am
basically in agreement with the scholarly critique of nationalist myths,
but the scholarly critique can be equally unhelpful when it denies any
historical connection between the modern nation and the historical society
from wence it emerges. In this article I want to suggest that these are
both complex societies with distinct historical connections to the past,
but these connections are not simple and continuous and nor are they
singular. Modern Indians and Chinese are heirs to multiple narratives of
political community which they have drawn upon and transformed. Since at least Ellie Kedourie
there has developed a tradition in the scholarship of nationalism which
rightly debunks nationalist histories for their mythologies and
suppressions of uncomfortable events. Alerting us to the
self-consciousness of this exercise, Benedict Anderson has recently
pointed out the unproblematic way in which Ernest Renan could write about
being "obliged to having already forgotten" wars between
different polities: and how these wars subsequently came to be written as
"fratricides" among fellow Frenchmen (Anderson 1991, 200). While
I am sympathetic with the critique of teleology in this literature, I am
suspicious of the proposition which often accompanies it: that nationalism
is a radically novel mode of consciousness. Suspicious (a) because this
position ignores the complexity of the nature of historical memory and
causality and (b) because it remains tied to the idea of
self-consciousness as a uniquely modern phenomenon. In neither modern nor
pre-modern society is it possible to sustain the notion of a unified
consciousness presumed by the concept of nationalism. Two of the most influential
recent works on nationalism, by Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict
Anderson (1983, revised 1991), emphasize the radically novel and modern
nature of nationalist consciousness. Both are extremely fine studies and
while I agree with many of their insights regarding the reproduction of
nationalist ideology, I would like to challenge their interpretation of
the nature and history of nationalist consciousness. Both analysts
identify national consciousness conventionally as the co-extensiveness of
politics and culture: an over-riding identification of the individual with
a culture that is protected by the state. Both also provide a sociological
account of how it was only in the modem era that such a type of
consciousness-where people from diverse locales could "imagine"
themselves as part of a single community-was made possible. Gellner presents the
following account of this discontinuity. Pre-industrial society is formed
of segmentary communities, each isolated from the other, with an
inaccessible high culture jealously guarded by a Gellner's general term
for literate ruling elites. With the growth of industrialism, Society
requires a skilled literate and mobile work force. The segmentary form of
communities is no longer adequate to create a homogenously educated work
force in which the individual members are interchangeable. The state comes
to be in charge of the nation, and through control of education creates
the requisite interchangeability of individuals, The primary
identification with segmentary communities is thus transferred to the
nation state as the producer of culture (1983). Thus a new type of
consciousness, born of an homogenous culture and tied to the state,
emerges in a industrial society. In Anderson's view,
nationalist consciousness was made possible with the breakdown of three
defining characteristics of pre-modern society: sacred scripts, divine
kingship and the conflation of history with cosmology. Together these had
made for an unself-conscious coherence in society which broke down with
the spread of print media through the engine of the Capitalist market.
Print capitalism permitted an unprecedented mode of apprehending time that
was "empty" and "homogenous"- expressed in an ability
to imagine the simultaneous existence of one's co-nationals. Travel and
the territorialization of the faith relativized this community defining it
as limited and the decline of monarchy transferred sovereignty to the
community To be sure, many of the characteristics of nationalism evolve
historically through a succession of modular types of nationalist
movements - one of Anderson's most interesting concepts. But he believes,
nonetheless, that nationalisms have a defining systemic unity embodied in
the unique type of self-consciousness of the people imagining themselves
as one (1983, rev. 1991). Consider first the argument
empirically. The long history of complex civilizations such as that of
China does not fit the picture of isolated communities and a vertically
separate but unified clerisy. We now have considerable research about
complex networks of trade, pilgrimage, migration and sojourning that
linked villages to wider communities and political structures. We have
also had a sense of how, through central place theory, these linkages
worked to transmit resources and information though the society, as well
as a differentiated picture of what areas, and when these areas, were more
or less integrated with the central places of the empire (Skinner 1964,
1977). This was the case as well in Tokugawa Japan and 18th century India
(Bayly 1983, Habib 1963). Moreover, even if the reach of the bureaucratic
state was limited, notions of the culture-state indicate the widespread
presence of common cultural ideas which linked the state to communities
and sustained the polity. It was not only, or perhaps
even primarily, the print media that enabled Han Chinese to develop a
sharp sense of the Other, and hence of themselves as a community, when
they confronted other communities. The exclusive emphasis on print
capitalism as enabling the imagining of a common destiny and the concept
of simultaneity ignores the complex relationship between the written and
spoken word. In agrarian civilizations this interrelationship furnishes an
extremely rich and subtle context for communication across the culture.
For instance, in pan-Chinese myths, such as that of gods Mazu and Guandi,
not only were oral and written traditions thoroughly intertwined, but the
myth provided a medium whereby different groups could announce their
participation in a national
culture even as they inscribed their own interpretation of the myth
(through the written and other cultural media, such as folk drama and
iconography) (Watson 1985, Duara 1988). As such, these groups were
articulating their understanding of the wider cultural and political order
from their own particular perspective. There were large numbers of people
in agrarian societies who were conscious of their culture and identity at
multiple levels, and in that sense were perhaps not nearly so different
from their modem counterparts. The point is not so much that
national identity existed in pre-modern times; rather it is that the
manner in which we have conceptualized political "identities" is
fundamentally problematic. In privileging modern society as the only
social form capable of generating political self-awareness, Gellner and
Anderson regard national identity as a distinctly modern mode of
consciousness: the nation as a whole imagining itself to be the cohesive
subject of history. The empirical record does not furnish the basis for
such a strong statement about the polarity between the modern and the
pre-modern. Individuals and groups in both modern and agrarian societies
identify simultaneously with several communities that are all imagined;
these identifications are historically changeable, and often conflicted
internally and with each other. As we shall see, whether in India or
China, people historically identified with different representations of
communities, and when these identifications became politicized they came
to resemble what is called modern "national identities". Behind this modern versus
pre-modern polarity lies the assumption of modern consciousness as a unified
episteme marked by an epistemological break with past forms of
consciousness. As modern subjectivity, the nation is ipso facto denied any credible links with the past. At the heart of
this break is a deep confusion between the novelty and indeed
revolutionary character of institutional arrangements in the modern world,
and the radical novelty of consciousness, specifically of a cohesive and
self-aware collective subject. Indeed, the self-consciousness of modern
subjectivity in the writings of these analysts bears an unexpected
resemblance to Hegelian epistemology. For Hegel the unfolding of Spirit
(reason) through History culminates as man "stands in a conscious
relation to his Spirit" (Hegel 1956, 103) and that nation-state,
unlike other communities, possesses a self-consciousness because it
involves the production of History in its very progress. But having
attained Self-consciousness it also stands at the end of History. Quite
apart from the validity of such a characterization of "modem
consciousness", we may also remind ourselves of the destructive side
of this epistemology which justified domination of "unself
conscious" societies and polities as the Other of the modern,
rational self. These modern analysts assume
the cohesive collective subject of History as (b)possible and (b)possible
only in me modern era. My alternative obliges me to reject both positions.
In the strong sense, a cohesive self-conscious subject is an abstraction:
as we have seen in the introduction, the meaning of the nation for the
pluralities which inhabit and may identify with it-whether it be a denizen
of New Delhi or an Assamese fisherman-are as different as they are
themselves from each other. in a restricted and temporary sense, however,
the nation may exist as a unified subjectivity: a provisional
relationship, a historical configuration in which the national "self'
is defined in relation to tine Other. Depending on the nature and scale of
the oppositional term, the national self contains various smaller
"others"- historical others that have effected an often uneasy
reconciliation among themselves and potential others that are beginning to
form this differences. Thus we must reject (b) in both the strong and the
restricted senses and (a) in the strong, though not in the weaker,
relational sense. But if we can salvage a unified subjectivity only in
this weak sense, this subjectivity is by no means uniquely a product of
modern society. I will argue that there were
totalizing representations and narratives of community with which people
identified historically and with which they may continue to identify into
the modern nation. Of course, pre-modern political identifications do not
necessarily or telcologically develop into the national identifications of
modem times and there are significant ruptures with the past. A new
vocabulary and a new political system-the world system of nation-states -
selects, adapts, re-organizes and even re-creates these older
representations. But the historical memory of archaic totalizations does
not always disappear and as this memory is periodically re-enacted, it
often provides potent material along which to mobilize the new community.
The real significance of the historical question lies in understanding
that the relationship between the past and present is not a simple causal
one, but a complex set of transactions in which the past remains
materially and politically relevant in the present. Historical
Models of political Community In India and China,
representations of community as a social totality are not new. Historical
conceptions of political community have lived off a process of radical
"Othering" and were periodically re-enacted, thus keeping them
alive in historical memory. Of course, at different times, different
social forces have seized this memory and turned it to their own needs,
but the very process of its pursuit has enhanced the power of this
historical memory. At the same time, it was an awareness of social
totality that co-existed historically with other representations,
including competing visions of community. Let us first consider the
case of imperial China. Before
the advent of the modern nation-state there were several models of
political community in China. One of these has been called "culturalism"
and has been counter-posed to modern nationalism. Joseph Levenson was the
most articulate advocate of the idea of cultualism which he saw as a mode
of consciousness distinct from nationalism. Levenson observed a radical
discontinuity between a nationalistic identity which he believed came to
Chinese intellectuals around the turn of the 20th century, and earlier
forms of Chinese. The high culture, ideology and identification of the
literati, he believed, were principally forms cultural consciousness, an
identification with the moral goals and values of a universalizing
civilization. Thus the significant transition here is from a "culturalism"
to a nationalism to the awareness of the nation-state as the ultimate goal
of the community (Levenson 1965). Culturalism referred to a natural
conviction of cultural superiority that sought no legitimation or defence
outside of the culture itself. Only when, according to Levenson, cultural
values sought legitimation in the face of the challenge posed by the Other
in the late 19th century, do we begin to see "decaying culturalism"
and its rapid transformation to nationalism - or to a culture protected by
the state (politicization of culture). Levenson's notion of
culturalism has enabled us to identify a particular conception or
representation of political community that may have emanated from the
literati (although, identification with this representation was not
necessarily restricted to the literati). Where he is mistaken, I believe,
is in distinguishing culturalism as a radically different mode of
identification from ethnic or national identification. In order for it to
exist as a pure expression of cultural superiority, culturalism would have
to feel no threat from an Other seeking to obliterate these values. In
fact this threat arose historically on several occasions and produced
several reactions from the Chinese literati and populace. First, there was
a rejection of the universalist pretensions of Chinese culture and of the
principle that separated culture from politics and the state. This
manifested itself in a form of ethnocentrism that we will consider in a
moment. A second, more subtle, response involved the transformation of
cultural universalism from a set of substantive moral claims into a
relatively abstract official doctrine. This doctrine was often used to
conceal the compromises that the elite and imperial state had to make in
their ability to practise these values or to conceal their inability to
make people who should have been participating in the cultural-moral,
order actually do so. The universalistic claims of Chinese imperial
culture constantly bumped up against and adapted to, alternative views of
the world order which it tended to cover with the rhetoric of
universalism: this was its defensive strategy. Consider this second reaction
first. The Jin and Mongol invasions of north China during the 12th century
and their scant respect for Chinese culture produced an ideological
defensiveness in the face of the relativization of the conception of the
universal empire (tianxia). In the 12th, and 13th centuries Confucian universalists
could only maintain their universalism by performing two sleights of hand:
connecting individuals to the infinite - rather than to a regime espousing
universal values, thus severing theory from fact; and internalizing the
determination of personal values - rather than making it contingent upon
the traditional Confucian concern with an objective moral order (Trauzettel
1975). During' the Ming ragine, a Han dynasty that succeeded the Mongols,
Chinese historians dealt with the lack of fit between much of the known
world and the Chinese world view simply by maintaining a silence. (Wang
1968, 45-46). When we look at the tribute trade system which is often
cited as the paradigmatic expression of its universalistic claims to moral
superiority, the imperial state adapted readily to the practical power
politics of the day. For instance, in the early 19th century", the
tiny northwestern khanate of Kokand successfully challenged the Qing
tribute system (like the Jesuits, the Russians and several others before)
and had established all but the formal declaration of equality with the
Chinese empire. The Qing was forced into a negotiated settlement but it
continued to use the language of universalism - civilizing values
radiating from the son of heaven-to conceal the altered power relations
between the two (Fletcher 1978b). It seems evident that when
the universalistic claims of this culture were repeatedly compromised and
efforts were made to conceal these compromises, advocates of this
universalism were operating within the tacit idea of a Chinese
universalism - which is of course none other than a hidden form of
relativism. We have tended to accept Chinese declarations of universalism
at face value far more readily than we do other official doctrines. Is it
perhaps because it plays a crucial role as the Other in interpretations of
the encounter with the nation-states of the west? Viewing "culturalism"
(or universalism) as a "Chinese culturalism" is to see it not as
a form of cultural consciousness par se, but rather to see culture - a
specific culture of the imperial state and Confucian orthodoxy - as a
criterion defining a community. Membership in this community was defined
by participation in a ritual order which embodied allegiance to Chinese
ideas and ethics centred around the Chinese emperor. While this
representation of political community may seem rather distant from
nationalism, one should consider the fact that the territorial boundaries
and peoples of the contemporary Chinese nation correspond roughly to the
Qing empire that was held together ideologically precisely by these ritual
practices. Just as significantly, during
the Jin invasion of the 12th century, segments of the scholar class
completely abandoned the concentric, radiant concept of universal empire
for a circumscribed notion of the Han community and fatherland guo
in which the barbarians had no place. This ethnocentric notion of
Chineseness was, of course, not new. Chinese authors typically trace it to
a quotation from the ancient classic, the Zuozhuan: "the hearts of those who are not of our race must be
different" (Li Guoqi 1970, 20; Dow 1982, 353). Others (Langlois 1980,
362) find it still earlier in the concentric realm of inner and outer
barbarians found in the; Shang Shu: pacific
cultural activities were to prevail in the inner part whose inhabitants
were not characterized as ethnically different, with militancy towards the
outer barbarians who appeared to be unassimilable. Trautzell believes that
in the Song, this ethnocentrism brought together state and "the
people". The state sought to cultivate the notion of loyalty to the
fatherland downward into peasant communities from among whom arose
resistance against the Jin in the name of Han Chinese culture and the Song
dynasty (1975). While we see the
representation of the ethnic nation most clearly in the Song, it
re-appeared after the Manchu conquest in 1644. Its most explicit advocate
in the late imperial period was Wang Fuzhi. Wang likened the differences
between Manchus and Han to that between jade and snow, which are both
white but different in nature, or more ominously, between a horse and a
man of the same colour whose natures are obviously different (Li Guoqi
1970, 22). To be sure, it was the possession of civilization (wen) by the
Han that distinguished them from the barbarians, but it did not stop him
from the view that "it is not inhumane to annihilate (the barbarians)
...because faithfulness and righteousness are the ways of human
intercourse and are not to be extended to alien kinds (i-lei
(yilet) (in Langlois 1980, 364). Although Wang may have espoused the
most extreme view of his generation, several prominent scholars of the
Ming-Qing transition era held on to the idea of the fundamental
unassimilability of the yi (barbarian) by the Hua (Chinese) (see Onogawa
1970, and Wu Weito 1970). Despite the undoubted success
with which the Qing made themselves acceptable as the legitimate sons of
heaven, they were unable to completely suppress the ethnocentric
opposition to their rule either at a popular level or among the scholarly
elite. The anti-Manchu writings of Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu
during the early period of Qing rule, together with collections of stories
of Manchu atrocities during the time (Mingji
Yeshi: Unofficial history of the late Ming) staged a re-appearance
around the middle of the 19th century (Wu Weito 1970, 263). Zhang Taiyan,
for instance, claims to having been nourished by a tradition both in his
family and in wider Zhejiang society which held that the defense of the
Han against the barbarians (V : Xia) was as important as the righteousness of a ruler (Onogawa
1970, 216). Certainly Han exclusivism seems to have reached a height by
the late 18th century when the dominant Han majority confronted the
non-Han minorities of China in greater numbers than ever before over
competition for increasingly scarce resources (Naquin and Rawski 1987).
Thus it is hardly surprising to find that, from at least the time of
resistance to the increased foreign presence in south China after the
Opium Wars through to the Boxer rebellion of 1898-1900, there existed a
general expectation, not only among the elite, but also among the
populace, that the state would protect the culture and the people of the
empire (Wakeman 1966, Esherick 1987). Although not all segments of the
population were affected by it, this representation of political community
was sufficiently rooted to make it a powerful mobilizing force in the 19th
and 20th centuries. Thus we are able to discern
at least two representations of political community in imperial Chinese
society: the exclusive Han-based one founded on an ascriptive principle,
and the other, based on the cultural values and doctrines of a Chinese
elite. What has been described as culturalism was a statement of Chinese
values as superior but, significantly, not exclusive. Through a process of
education and imitation, barbarians could also become part of a community
sharing common values and distinguishing themselves from yet other
barbarians who did not share these values. Thus the cultural conception
resembled the ethnic conception in that both periodically defined the
distinguishing marks and boundaries of a politicized community; only the
criterion of admissibility into the community differed. In
history, the two representations were both
separate and related. As we have seen, at any point in time, the
efforts to realize the one or the other could have very different effects
- indeed, life and death effects - regarding who was to be considered
inside and who outside the community. But as John Fincher has pointed out,
"culturalism" and "racism" were also intertwined in
such a way that the "historian's vocabulary has no very satisfactory
definition of the strong sense of political community in 'traditional'
China." (Fincher 1972, 69). Fincher looks at the writings of the
anti-Mongol thinker, Fang Xiaoru (1357-1402) who in the face of general
literati support of the Mongol dynasty, made a clear racialist distinction
between the Mongols whom he likened to animals and Han Chinese. Yet, if
the border between Chinese and barbarians was impermeable and based on
biological fact, Fang was still For
Hegel, the ancient cultures of China and India each represented a lack in
relation to the full development of Spirit which complemented the other.
Spirit had made its progress through these cultures but found them wanting
in tie unity of the freedom of
individual and state, of Unity and Difference, which made for true
self-consciousness. China possessed objective rationality in the State but
the state and its The notion of a lack of a
state in India, or conversely, the overpowering role of society (read
caste) is so deeply ingrained in both lndology and general understandings
of India, that we tend to be especially suspicious about characterizations
of totalizing political communities in pre-colonial India. Let us consider
the cosmic ideology of Brahmanism because, in many ways, Brahmanic
universalism (an obviously more specific and serviceable term than
Hinduism) is interpreted similarly to Chinese culturalism. Ainslee Embree
has summed up its core features: it includes the concept of tie cosmic
order and the role of the Brahmin in maintaining and interpreting this
order; the concept of multi-levelled truth, of a hierarchical but rational
order of society, of karma, of re-incarnation, and of the concept of
dharma (religious or moral duty) (Embree 1985, 23-24). As in Confucianism,
Brahmanic universalism is not dependent upon the wielding of state power,
but rather exercises its control from outside and upon the state. To be sure, a scholar like
Embree believes that in some ways Brahmanism did provide a historical
basis of a unifying ideology. Brahmanic texts became the source of
political and social legitimacy for Hindu rulers since the 1st century
B.C. Moreover, these texts showed some familiarity with the natural
boundaries of the sub-continent and an awareness of Aryavarta (land of the
Hindus/Aryans) as a cultural region and a common heritage of language and
value with others of their class throughout the sub-continent (Embree
1985, 27). But he believes that it is precisely this Brahmanism which
prevented actual states from achieving a conflation of polity and
community within the state because its universalism constantly directed
the attention of Hindu rulers away from this goal and towards a
de-territorialized, cosmic order (Embree 1985, 32). Thus the sum of
Embree's argument appears to be that while Brahmanism provided the
framework for a cultural community, it did not and could not produce that
conflation of culture and polity so necessary to the emergence of nations. More recent work, however,
indicates that such a judgement of culturalist determinism may be
premature. Just as cultural universalism was relativized (even while
retaining its doctrine officially) as a result of the great Central Asian
invasions in China, Brahmanic India was also so affected by the Central
Asian invasions from the 11th to the 14th centuries. In a nuanced and
detailed analysis of the Ramayana epic before and during this period,
Shelaon Pollock, finds that this epic became the principal means of
creating a representation of the politicized community in medieval Hindu
India. Such was not the case with the other famous Indian epic, the
Mahabharata, in which the problem of political power "man is slave to
power, but power is slave to no man" - cannot be strictly said to be
resolved because the fratricidal struggle
is accompanied by a profound moral ambiguity. As Pollock puts it, not only
is the antagonist not "othered" in the Mahabharata, but rather,
they can never forget that they are indeed "brothered"(Pollock
1993, 281-3). In contrast, the Ramayana
responds to the problem of political power by a straightforward
divinization of the king, Flama. According to Poilock the divine king is
the only being on earth capable of combatting evil and evil itself is
clearly othered", or more exactly, demonized. The period from the
11th to 14th centuries witnessed the Turkic invasions of India and Muslim
political control came to be more or less established by the end of the
period. This was also precisely the time when the divine political order
of the Ramayana became historically grounded as numerous dynastic
histories began to read the political world through the Ramayana narrative
(Pollock 1993, 273-277). Although Pollock furnishes many examples,
particularly clear is the explicit identification of the historical ruler,
Prithviraja II (12th century), with the divine Rama and the explicit
demonization of the enemy, the Turkic forces from Central Asia. The
Ramayana enabled a totaiizing conception of society built upon a radical
distinction between self versus Other. Thus, once again
we discover that relativization finds its way into a cosmic ideology and
creates a representation of political community - in this case, a Hindu
political community - where culture and polity are conflated. Pollock also
emphasizes that the Ramayana was repeatedly instrumentalized by Hindu
elites of the medieval period to provide a "theology of politics and
a symbology of otherness" (Pollock 1993. 286). To be sure, we are not
referring to a real identification with this community among all who
considered themselves Hindu, nor was it territorially coextensive with all
of India. Rather, we are speaking of a representation of political
community with which it was possible to identify and around which to
mobilize. Migration, sojourning, and pilgrimage which often followed
trading networks and which probably intensified during the medieval
period, brought these ideas and rituals to a large community of believers
Pilgrimage is perhaps the privileged means by which a religious community
is both ritually and spatially delimited. In India, pilgrimage centres
marked an inter-linked, sub-continent-wide territory not simply as a
sacred space, but in the face of a demonized Other living in this
territory, as the sacred space of Hindus. While no Hindu power was able
to successfully construct the politicized religious community across the
sub-continent, we should not ignore the fact that it existed as a
representation and several rulers, from Prithviraj II in the 12th century
to the Marathas or Jai Singh of Jaipur in 18th century, did try to
actualize it. At the same time, the drive towards the Brahmanical goal of
a Hindu community. Bharatvarsha or Aryavarta, was countered by the urge to
create the regional political community. The literature on regional states
is most abundant for the 18th century successor states to the Mughal
empire such as the Sikh and Maratha kingdoms. At one level, these 18th
century polities were a product of state-building processes developing
around emergent capital markets, professional service classes, modern
European military technology and standing armies (Bayly 1983). At another level, they were
built around medieval devotional cults (Bhakti) which had integrated the
regions linguistically. The syncretic impulses of these cults which
created a popular literature of regional identification co-exited in some
tension with the pan-Hindu model of political community we have outlined
above. In the 18th century Maratha state, for instance, N. K. Wagle (1989)
reveals how Maharashtrian Hindu chroniclers, Muslim saints and local
judges sought ways to create a syncretic, regional tradition of adaptation
and compromise even while the distinction between Hindus and Muslims was
all too clear. Finally,
there existed a concept of political community which the Rudolphs have
called the sub-continental empire. This appears to have been a regulative
ideal among those who sought to rule South Asia as an empire. According to
the Rudolphs, the sub-continental empire was a polity of ancient origins
which recognized To characterize pre-modern
India and China simply as universal empires whose elites (mandarin or
Brahmin) were concerned with cosmic values while the peasants lived with
their noses to the soil misses the complex and dynamic nature of these
societies. Individuals, strata or groups identified not only with one or
more of the different representations of communities we have outlined
above, but with others as well: provincial, linguistic and sectarian for
example. We have also observed the unstable, intersecting and
supplementary character of these representations and correspondingly, the
identifications of people with them. Even while such a self-aware
historical community may later disappear socially, the trace of it often
lives on in historical memory and can return to haunt the present. The
Analytics of Community Closure
How do historical groups try
to transform a society with multiple representations of political
community into a single social totality? This process involves the
hardening of social and cultural boundaries around a particular
configuration of self in relation to an Other. Its analysis is important
for my larger argument about history because this process of closure is
relevant to both historical and modern communities; moreover, it reveals
the role of existing historical and cultural resources in the
transformation. Sociologically, we may think
of communities not as well-bounded entities but as possessing various
different and mobile boundaries that demarcate different dimensions of
life. These boundaries may be either soft or hard. One or more of the
cultural practices of a group, such as rituals, language, dialect, music,
kinship rules or culinary habits, may be considered soft boundaries if
they identify a group but do not prevent the group from sharing and even
adopting, self-consciously or not, the practices of another. Groups with
soft boundaries between each other are sometimes so unselfconscious about
their differences that they do not view mutual boundary breach as a threat
and could eventually even amalgamate into one community. Thus, differences
in dietary and religious practices may not prevent the sharing of a range
of practices between local Hui muslim and Han communities. The important
point is that they tolerate the sharing of some and the non-sharing of
other boundaries. An incipient nationality is
formed when the perception of the boundaries of community are transformed:
when soft boundaries are transformed into hard ones. This happens when a
group succeeds in imposing a historical narrative of descent and/or
dissent upon both heterogeneous and related cultural practices. I will
permit myself a deconstructive excess and coin the word, discent
to suggest the porosity of these two signifiers. It reveals how the
tracing of a history is frequently linked to differentiating the self from
an Other. The narrative of ¢ serves as a template by which the
cultural cloth will be cut and given shape and meaning. When this
narrative is imposed upon cultural materials, the relevant community is
formed not primarily by the creation of new cultural forms - or even the
invention of tradition - but by transforming the perception of the
boundaries of the community. The narrative of discent
is used to define and mobilize a community often by privileging a
particular cultural practice (or a set of such practices) as the
constitutive principle of the community - such as language, religion of
common historical experience - thereby heightening the self-consciousness
of this community in relation to those around it. Not only do communities
with rigidified boundaries privilege their differences, they tend to
develop an intolerance and suspicions toward the adoption of the other's
practices and strive to distinguish, in some way or the other, practices
that they share. In this sense, communities with hard boundaries will the
differences between them. Because the narrative
succeeds in privileging certain cultural meanings as the constitutive
principle of a community, it shapes the composition of the community: who
belongs and who does not, who is privileged and who is not. Thus if common
history (or Confucian ritual)~ is privileged over language and race,
language and race always lie as potential counter-narratives: mobilizers
of an alternative nation that will distribute its marginals differently.
Thus within the hard community there will always be other soft boundaries
which may potentially transform into hard boundaries, or new soft
boundaries may emerge and transform into hard ones. A bifurcated history
(see below) will be particularly attentive to these emergent narratives
which are often effaced or appropriated by the dominant narrative. This mode of analysis
challenges the notion of a stable community that gradually develops a
national self-awareness like the evolution of a species (History). Rather
it asserts a deliberate mobilization within a network of cultural
representations towards a particular object of identification. In the
following essays, we will examine the role of various social actors -
often different groups of intellectuals and politicians - who develop and
deploy narratives to re-define the boundaries and identities of a
collectivity with multiple identifications. But even when this closure is
successful, it will unravel in time; the privileged practices that
organize this identification will also change. Consider
the example of Manchu identity. The Qing dynasty (1644-1911) originated
from a Manchu ethnic community which maintained an ambivalent attitude
towards the dominant Han culture that it ruled. In the early stages of its
rule it actively sought to maintain Manchu distinctiveness through a
variety of means, including a ban on inter-marriage and Han migration to
Manchuria, and the fostering of different customs. In time, however, not
only was the ban on migration and inter-marriage ignored, but Manchu
embrace of Chinese political institutions caused it to blur the
distinctions between it and the communities it ruled. More importantly,
and unlike the Mongols, the Manchus recognized early the roots of politics
in culture and rapidly became the patrons not only of elite culture, but
also of popular Han gods like Guandi At the same time, however,
powerful counter-tendencies worked to shore up - or reconstruct - a Manchu
identity. Most noteworthy was the effort of the Qianlong emperor
(1736-1795) to introduce a classic narrative of discent
of the Manchus - the "Researches of Manchu Origins"
discussed by Crossley (1987). "Researches" traced the descent of
the Manchu clans to the first attestable peoples of the northeast thereby
demonstrating a "racial" distinctiveness which Crossley defines
as "immutable identity based on ancestral descent" (1987, 762).
Moreover, it celebrated the Manchus as inheritors of the imperial,
tradition of the region which was independent of (dissented from) the Han
Chinese imperial tradition and most closely associated with the Jin empire
of the 12th century. To be sure, this narrative of discent
played a part within a wider representation of power necessitated by
the imperatives of ruling an empire which ~ encompassed both Han Chinese
and Central Asian politics (Crossley 1987; Kuhn 1990, 69). Confucian
universalism was off-set by racial exclusivism, because as Crossley says,
every "racial" group - Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Han and
others - had their proper status according to their race. These races bore
a relationship to the emperor set by the historical role of their
ancestors in the creation and development of the state (Crossley 1987,
780). But this narrative which endorsed a conception of "race"
as a constitutive principle of community, was also motivated by the fear
on the part of the emperor of total cultural extinction of the Manchus.
Thus, the Qianlong emperor took it upon himself to champion the Manchu
language and values and punish those who forgot their roots (Kuhn 1990,
66-68). Manchu identity
flowered tragically in the late 19th century, both in response to
Qianlong's efforts and also as a reaction to a Han ethnic exclusivism that
became most evident during the years of the Taiping Rebellion. As early as
1840, in the days before the British attack on the lower Yangzi city of
Zhenjiang during the Opium War, the tension in the city led to hostility
between the Manchu soldiers in the garrisons and the civilian Han populace
in which countless Han were slaughtered by Manchu soldiers on the
allegation that they were traitors, Elliot shows that the entire event was
interpreted as ethnic conflict both by survivors and by local historians
(Elliot 1990, 64). This simmering tension culminated in the horrifying
massacre of Manchu bannermen and their families during the Taiping
Rebellion and again in the Republican revolution of 1911 (Crossley 1990,
130, 196197). Manchus in the Republican era sustained their identity only
by hiding it from public view and by quietly teaching the oral traditions
to their children and grandchildren within their homes. Today Manchu
identity finds expression not only in their status as a national minority
in the PRC, but as Crossley observes, in such forms as the Manchu
Association formed in Taipei in 1981 (Crossley 1990, 216). The Manchu search for its own
separate identity may be traced back to a narrative which privileged
"race" as the definer of community. The tragedy of it was that
this rhetoric forced a highly, if incompletely, assimilated people to turn
their back on what had, after all, become their culture. And yet it would
be wrong and untrue to the mode of analysis I have tried to establish here
to posit an essentializing evolutionary trend in the growth of Manchu
identity and the worsening of Han-Manchu relations. Crossley is sensitive
to the ambivalences of Manchus towards this identity and important leaders
of the Confucian intelligentsia were committed to a cosmopolitanism within
their nationalism that included the Manchus as Chinese. Perhaps least
understood in this regard are the Boxer "rebels" and various
secret society groups in the last decades of the 19th century, who
actually sought to support the Qing court - as the representative of
Chinese culture - in the effort to expel the hated Westerner. My effort to link narratives
of discent to the self-definition of a group is relevant not only for
ethnic nationalisms such as those of the Manchu or Mongols, but also for
those less visible communities within. These include regional and
provincial groupings within the Han such as the Cantonese, the so-called
"sub-ethnic" groups such as the Tanka boat people, the Hui and
Subei people. For example, the mid-19th century Taiping Rebellion was
built up by the Hakka minority of south China who discovered a narrative
of discent in a version of
Christianity which depicted them as a "chosen people". This
narrative gave them a mission as "god-worshippers" in their
protracted, dreary battle against the earlier, and now, idolatrous
settlers in south China and caused them to celebrate their own distinctive
traditions over those of the larger Han community of which they were a
highly ambiguous part. As the movement developed imperial ambitions, the
Hakka coupled their anti-idolatrous message with appeals to an older
rhetoric of the struggle of the Han against the Manchu (Kuhn 1977). The
Taiping movement is instructive in showing how a community which had been
successfully hardened by a redemptive narrative of discent was once again
forced to re-negotiate its identity. The process of community
closure which we have analyzed here principally for a period before the
establishment of modern nationalism is, as we shall see, also relevant.
for modern nationalism. Moreover, the conceptualization of a narrative of discent
which I will apply to the later period as well, suggests that the process
forging an exclusive or over-riding identity is not usually constructed de
nova, but built from existing representations of community, although
much is lost and transformed in the process. Finally, I wish to show that
in both pre-modern and modern societies a plurality of representations and
narratives continues to persist, even though the technical and
institutional means of both closure and resistance differ in the two
societies. The Modern
Nation-state System and the Question of History We have observed that what is
novel about modern nationalism is not political self-consciousness, but
the world system of nation-states. Over
the last century, this system, which sanctions the nation-state as the
only legitimate form of polity, has expanded to cover the globe.
Externally, the nation-state claims sovereignty within distinct, but not
undisputed, territorial boundaries. Internally, the state claims to
represent the people of the nation and through this claim, has steadily
expanded its role in society, often at the expense of local authority
structures. For instance, Children" have come increasingly under the
jurisdiction of the state as the institutional rules governing childhood
were diffused to all types of nation-states over the last hundred years (Boli-Sennet
and Meyer 1978). It is important to grasp that the form of the
nation-state is sanctioned by a battery of discourses generated from the
system as a whole. We have seen how Social Darwinism joined race and
History to the nation-state. Later, anti-imperialism and even socialism
and Marxism would come to sanction the nation-state. At the same time,
these nation-states also have to confront other alternative or historical
representations from within the societies they govern. The territorial conception of
the nation also has a history which may be traced to what William McNeill
has characterized as the system of competitive European states. From as
far back as 1000 A.D., each of these states was driven by the urge to
increase its resources, population and military technology over
the others. In their competition, these states gradually became
dependent on capital markets, both externally and internally, which
further propelled the development of their economy and the competition
between them (McNeil1 1982). In time, the Church came to sanction some of
these emergent regional states by endowing them with a theory of
sovereignty without at the same time obliging them to achieve
universalizing empire. This was possible because of the separation of
temporal and spiritual authority, or, in other words, the source of
legitimacy from actual exercise of power (Armstrong 1982). The culmination
of this conception of the nation was first seen in the French revolution
and exemplified in the idea of citizenship for all within the territory (Eley
1981). However, no contemporary
nation-state is a nation exclusively in this territorial sense. Even among
the early modern European states, European dynasts had to combine the
theory of territorial sovereignty with ethnicity to create modern nation
states (Armstrong 1982). While most historical nations, defined as
self-aware and even politicized communities, may have lacked the
conception of themselves as part of a system of territorially sovereign
nation-states, at the same time, modern nations seek the sources of their
cohesion not in the territorial conception but from a narrative of the
nation that privileges a particular principle defining community, say
language, race, religion et al (and repressing the others). It is true, as
Salibar (1991) and others point out, that territorial boundaries can
themselves acquire a salience and develop powerful attachments for their
citizens. Yet, even these territorial identifications have to be founded
on an inherited, if contested, narrative of the "homeland" such
as the "central plain" (Zhongyuan) or Aryavarta. The shape and
content of national identities in the modern era are a product of
negotiation between remembered historical narratives of community and the
institutionalized discourses of the modern nation-state system. How
did modern representations of the nation engage with historical narratives
in China during the years before the Republican revolution of 1911 when
modern nationalism took hold among the Chinese htelligentsia? The
constitutional monarchists, represented by Kang Youwei, inherited the
Confucian culturalist notion of community. Although Kang was influenced by
modern ideas, the conception of political community that he retained drew
on culturalist Confucian notions, We see this in his lifelong devotion to
the emperor (protect the Emperor Society), which in the political context
of the time meant more than a nostalgia for monarchy. Since the monarchs
were Manchu and not Han it implied that he was convinced that community In his debates with the
anti-Manchu revolutionary Zhang Taiyan, Kang cited Confucius to argue that
although Confucius had spoken of barbarians, barbarism was expressed as a
lack of ritual and memory of the cultural community, Kang declared that
during the Warring States, Wu and Chu had been different countries, but
had become parts of China by the time of Han. Similarly, although Manchus
were barbarians in the Ming, by now they had acquired Chinese culture and
so had become Chinese. Kang asked whether it was necessary for China to
get rid of the Manchus in order to build a new nation or whether the
nation could embrace all ethnic groups on a harmonious basis, including
the Manchus, Hans, Miaos and Moslems, as well as the Tibetans? (Onogawa
1970, 245,249). The revolutionaries, such as
Zhang Taiyan and Wang Jingwei, articulated their opposition to this
conception by drawing on the old ethnocentric tradition that acquired new
meaning in the highly charged atmosphere of the 1900s. To be sure, Zhang
was a complex figure whose thought can scarcely be reduced to any single
strain. But he and Wang Jingwei succeeded in articulating an image of the
new community that was persuasive to many in his generation. At the base
of this re-formulation of the old ethnocentrism was a dialectical reading
of Wang Fuzhi's notions of evolutionism inter-woven with a new Social
Darwinist conception of the survival of the fittest races. Thus each group
was engaged in dialogue with disputed legacies which were, nonetheless,
real and by no means completely reducible to modern discourses. We can gain a deeper
understanding of the complex transactions between the past and present
through the discourse and the representations of the revolutionaries than
through their elaborated theories, For instance, several scholars (Dikotter
1992, Price 1992) have pointed out the way in which the values of the
Chinese lineage or descent line, perhaps one of the most important social
institutions in late imperial China were "translated" to develop
the modern concept of race. The transition from lineage to this conception
of race as a community united by blood ties was enabled by the common
semantic source, the signifier zu,
which referred to the descent group and also to race or kind (a term also
of greatest importance to Wang Fuzhi in the 17th century (Dikotte 291).
Republican revolutionaries like Chen Tianhua, Zou Rang and Song Jiaoren
were able to maneuver within the play of this signifier and, hence, with
the emotions it evoked such as filiality. Thus Chen Tianhua pronounced:
"The Han race is one big family. The [mythic] Yellow Emperor is the
great ancestor, all those who are not of the Han race are not the
descendants of the Yellow Emperor, they are exterior families. One should
definitely not assist them" (cited in Dikotter 117). According to
Dikotter, "race" became the "symbol of fictive biological
cohesion that could link lineage loyalties in the face of foreign
aggression (71). Donald Price believes that the representation of the
nation embedded in the new conception of common descent from the Yellow
Emperor was enabled by an extended and re-defined filial piety (Xiao). Racial vengeance against the Manchus was now an obligation
one vowed to one's ancestors whether or not they were of one's immediate
lineage (Price 1052-1053). These notable contributions
to our understanding of early 20th century anti-Manchuism have emphasized
the manner in which historical ideas have enabled the transition to the
new evolutionist conception of the racial-nation. By linking race to the
more tangible cultural institution of lineage, the revolutionaries were
able to deploy an unfamiliar narrative-which as we have seen in chapter I
emphasized the strife between Historical and non-Historical races-as their
narrative of discent. In this way they could mobilize existing cultural symbols
to build the walls of a community without the Manchus. At the same time,
the new evolutionist narrative of History also tried to re-cast and so to
appropriate the dispersed meanings of existing symbols and practices.
Ancestor worship, filial piety and kinship terminology which tended to be
focussed within the lineage (zongzu)
were now sought also to be turned outward to the race and nation (Zongzu, minzu). Thus, the mythic Yellow Emperor whose status as
national symbol came to dominate nationalist discourse through the first
few decades of the 20th century, continued to be officially revered as the
originator of the race and the founder of the nation until 1941. In 1957,
the religion of the Yellow Emperor was established in Taiwan with
government approval (Dikotter 1 16-117). Neither the notion of simple
continuity nor that of invention can do justice to the subtle transactions
between the past and the present. The past does not shape the present
simply by persisting in it. It enables the transformation of the present
and in that transformation, is itself much transformed. Attention to the
manner in which dominant narratives seek to inflect and mobilize the
meanings of existing symbols and practices offers a more promising
beginning to understanding history. The revolutionary position
also retained the capacity to invoke the oppositional culturalist model of
community as its supplement. The revolutionary invocation of the racialist
memory at the turn of the century could not confine the othering process
to the Manchus alone. The construction of the Han Chinese, self as the
national subject necessarily threatened other non-Han groups, as Kang
Youwei had warned it would. Most of the large minority communities had
viewed their incorporation into the Qing empire as being on a par with the
enforced incorporation of the Han: they did not equate the Qing empire
with Zhongguo (China). The overthrow of the Qing in 1911 created for them
the possibility of independence; the rhetoric of racialist nationalism
made it urgent. Given their own equation of nation and race, the
revolutionaries could hardly counter the growing Mongol independence
movement, the establishment of an independent Mongolia in 1911 (Nakami
1984), and the threatening situation in Tibet and Xinjiang. It was in
these circumstances that Sun Yat-sen and the leaders of the new Republic
sought to supplement their racialist narrative with the culturalist
narrative of the nation espoused by their enemies - the reformers and the
Qing court itself. The Chinese nation was now to be made up by the
"five races" (Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim and Han) and so it
happened that the boundaries of the Chinese nation came to follow the
outline of the old Qing empire just as the Indian nation was sought to be
made in the image of the British empire. Later, the narrative of race as
constitutive of the nation would itself be dispersed, or perhaps, absorbed
inside a larger nationalist narrative of the common historical experience
against imperialism. In India, several models of
political community furnished the framework within which the modern nation
was contested. We can find these historical conceptions within the motley
body of the Indian National Congress itself which emerged in the late 19th
century as the representative of Indian nationalism. Thus for instance,
the secularist model of Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore drew upon
the idealized conception of the sub-continental empire. The Rudolphs
(1985) point out that each of the empires in South Asia built upon the
symbols of the classical idea of a universal ruler: Akbar restoring the
Hindu idea of a chakravartin in
the Persian idea of shahanshah; the
British using Mughal ceremonies and language to re-vitalize the imperial
state. Thus colonisers and conquerors reinforced a process of political
formation whereby communities and regional kingdoms were incorporated (and
not subsumed or obliterated) into an ordered heterogeneity. Nehru may have been the first
to narratives a history of the sub-continental empire into what comes to
be known as the secular History of India. In his view, what he considered
India was the secular unity of different communities and religions, each
of which had made distinctive historical contributions. The achievements
of Hinduism, for him was merely one of the sources of India's greatness,
together with those of Buddhism, the Turkic emperors, traditional science
among other sources. For Nehru, the History of India was the most
authentic testimony to the capacity (read necessity) of Indians to
maintain a "unity among diversity". The high points of Indian
history were the reigns of Asoka, the Guptas, Akbar and the great Moghuls
all of whom attempted to develop a political framework to unite the
cultural diversity of the sub-continent. While in contemporary India this
idealized version is countered by a forceful process of state-building,
nonetheless, the memory of ordered heterogeneity is perhaps visible in the
notion of Indian secularism, which is not so much a strict separation of
state and society, as it is the equal support of the state for all
religions (Nehru 1960, 121-128). The memory of Brahmanic
universalism as the foundation of the new political community, filtered
through Orientalist discourses of the 19th century, was appropriated in
its split form as universalism and its supplement of closure. Its
universal form was articulated by Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) and others and
influenced Mohandas Gandhi. Aurobindo emphasized Advaita Hinduism, a
radically monistic faith which believes in the unity of all being and
denies the reality of the many particular entities in the universe. In
this highly abstract system, a communal framework was created to absorb or
tolerate heteregenous elements domestically within an essentially
Brahmanic universalism. Thinkers like Aurobindo and Gandhi had of course
to develop strategies to square the circle: to contain their universalism
within their terminal political community of the nation. One such strategy
was to devise the Spiritual East/Material West duality whereby India
remained the privileged locus as the origin and repository of true
(Hindu?) Spirituality. The supplement to Brahmanic
universalism, which in recent times has threatened to overcome this
universalism, is the historical memory of the nation-space as Aryavarta
whose charter is traced to the medieval political readings of the
Ramayana. Hindu nationalism has drawn much attention by its violent
mobilization campaigns to recover the site of the alleged birthplace of
Rama in Ayodhya from a Muslim shrine which existed there until Hindu
nationalists destroyed it in December 1992. The Ayodhya destruction is
only the most recent expression of a series of campaigns launched by Hindu
nationalists since the end of the 19th century, such as the protection of
the cow, the promotion of religious ceremonies to capture public spaces
and the take over of other Muslim shrines. These nationalists, like the
anti-Manchu revolutionaries, foreground atavistic revenge in their
narrative of discent. Through
this narrative of vengeance, they seek to re-invest local gods, local
issues and local conflicts with national meaning. Hindu nationalism has no
use for universalism and declares a homogenized Hinduness (Hindutva) to be
the sole or privileged criterion for inclusion in the political community
of the nation. They thus seek to transform the relative porous boundaries
of local communities into an over-arching hard boundary between a national
community and its Muslim Other. It is a project that recalls the radical
othering we found in representations of medieval Hindu community. Although
on the face of it, the lofty universalism of Aurobindo and Gandhi seems
far removed from such a thorough-going communalism; the supplement of
Hindu nationalism could easily exploit the ambivalence towards outsiders
within their thought. I have described a
multiplicity of historical representations of political community in China
and Indian which may be seen as examples of complex agranian polities.
This multiplicity includes the representation of totalizing communities
that both resemble modern nations and continue to be relevant to them. As
Such, even in recent theories of nationalism, notions of differences
between the modern nation and traditional empire turn out to be highly
exaggerated. Moreover, these notions reflect and reproduce a highly
suspect presumption of an epistemological gap between national
consciousness as cohesive and self-aware and pre-modern consciousness as
dominated either by universal cosmologies or parochial identities. The
modern nation is formed through a process similar to that of its
totalizing predecessors which deploys a narrative of discent-the
tracing of a history which legitimates its difference from the Other - to
fix and privilege a single identity from among the contesting multiplicity
of identifications. In neither society can this closure prevent
alternative narratives from challenging the hegemonic representation of
political community. Contemporary theories of nationalism are fascinated
by the ways in which nations "invent" or "imagine"
their pasts. The old, literate, and what Asish Nandy has called
"capacious" civilizations of India and China reveal that while
these histories are by no means determinative and are often highly
mediated modern nations still have to negotiate with the memories of past
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