It
is never less than a challenge to attempt to understand the cultural factors
which influence a nation’s conduct in the international arena. When that
nation is China and the subject of introspection is its relations with
India, such an endeavour can at best be fraught with far too many variables.
The two have had the longest uninterrupted existence as nations. Their
combined size and population makes them the largest geographical and human
resource mass on the planet. India and China have had cultural, religious
and trade links going back centuries in history. They also came into being
as nation states almost simultaneously in this century, They also share a
past of colonial and imperialist subjugation from which freedom had to be
won with a major struggle, Paradoxically enough, the two countries fought a
war with each other over disputed frontiers. That conflict episode, the
continuing border dispute between the two countries and China’s rapid
growth in military power, not unsurprisingly create anxieties about the
future relationship. China’s aggressive foreign policy postures also do
not encourage a benign view of it. There are enough strategic thinkers in
India who reckon China to be the major future threat to India. This short
essay attempts to focus on the military perspective of Sine-Indian
relations.
The
means adopted to secure freedom by China and India provide some indication
of the approaches adopted by them to cope with the international order. They
explain the methods the two nations brought to bear on their responses to
the geo-political situations. The basis of relationships established by the
two states bilaterally with other states were also founded in that
historical context. China had won its freedom through an armed struggle of
epic proportions. Its military was unlike any in history in its struggle
against overwhelming odds and its commitment to an ideology. Its military
leaders were living legends, but they were also simultaneously ideological
and political leaders. Marxist-Leninist revolutionary thought provided the
underpinnings to much of China’s post independence policy. The notion of
military power as an instrument of internal and external policy, formed a
not insubstantial part of the Chinese policy framework. This was not an
entirely new element in Chinese political management. China had a long
history of strong military involvement in the management of political
issues. The Marxist theology provided a perfect patina for a widespread and
traditional military content in China’s national life.
India
chose the route of non-violence and of political struggle through
constitutional means to wrest freedom from colonial rule. Its leaders
brought to bear on the freedom movement a long tradition of negotiation and
debate instead of armed struggle. There was no military content to the
freedom movement other than stray incidents of bomb throwing and use of
explosives. The better part of the struggle for independence was guided by
the insistence on non-violent means and adherence to constitutional norms.
As for the Indian military, its leaders were expressly advised by the
political leadership to keep well out of the freedom struggle that was being
waged. There was no military content in India’s highly successful mass
mobilisation against the British rule.
In
the post-independence period, China preferred to use military power
extensively in pursuit of its geopolitical aims. A confrontationist and
belligerent image of China was therefore inevitable. China’s choice of the
military option in a series of cases confirmed the image of a militarist
state willing to use its power to settle issues by force. Formosa (Taiwan),
Korea, the conflicts on the Sino-Soviet borders, the war with India in 1962,
China’s open espousal of the Pakistani cause during 1965 in what was a
purely bilateral conflict, China’s actions in the South China Sea, its
role in Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos make a very long list of contributive factors
compounding the image. China’s assistance over decades to sub-national and
ethnic groups with ideology funds, and weapons, retarded the progress of
newly independent states in her neighbourhood. Its acquiring of nuclear
weapons capability has evoked admiration but has not reduced concerns about
its future employment, given China’s record in managing international
relations. The image is not made any less adverse by the continuing growth
and modernisation in China’s military capabilities during the last decade.
The
Indian picture over the same period is a contrast in many ways. India was
tireless in its support to China’s cause in the international arena from
the very beginning. India’s attempts to grapple with the enormous task of
nation building, of social and distributive justice, of security against
external military and terrorist threats, of economic development through
democratic processes, were monumental in size and in the investments
required. These were not helped by China’s support through the decades of
the 1960s and 1970s to insurgent groups. They were made positively worse by
China’s assistance programme to Pakistan in nuclear and conventional
weapons. It is ironic that China which willingly embraced the concept of
Panchsheel in the 1950s with India and other newly independent states,
discarded its principles so soon and so comprehensively.
Attempts
have been made to view the contrasting positions, postures and processes
used by China and India through the lens of cultural history. The ancient
cultural contacts between the two nations were through a transfer of
religious thoughts, Intrepid travellers of ancient times carried images of
India to China. There is little to indicate that a reverse flow of images,
religious beliefs and learned treatises occurred. There is also inadequate
evidence of images about India and its thoughts and beliefs influencing the
policy choices of the ruling elites in China. It is useful to remember that
much of the India-China interaction took place through geographic areas in
the western reaches of ancient India and which no longer form part of India.
Trade between India and China formed a very small part of the totality of
their relationship. In military terms, the two nations shared no
commonalities in doctrine and organisational concepts. Perhaps the only
shared military experience between India and China was the Mongol invasions
of their territories.
The
pre-eminent written texts on national policy and security in the two nations
were the Arthashastra written by
Kautilya in India, and Art of War or
Bingfa by Sunzi (Sun Tzu) in
China. The latter is more widely known in the western translations as “On
War”. A comparison of the two provides some fascinating insights in the
two nations’ approaches to state policy. The differences become apparent
early in the titles given to the books. While Arthashastra
literally means the science of wealth (or of economy, in modem parlance), Bingfa
focuses on the ways of gaining victory in battles. Notwithstanding their
titles there are commonalites. The former effectively emphasises the
importance of military means in ensuring the safety and well being of the
state. The latter even as an emphatically military treatise gives importance
to the loyalty and well-being of the people, if wars are to be won. On the
other hand, the former dwells at length on matters of state-craft, economic
resources, political and other relations with other states, and the military
component forms only a part of the whole gamut of chapters. The latter is
emphatically militarist with a focus on conquests, victory in battles, the
techniques of achieving victories through surprise, strategems and so on. In
its philosophical foundation the Arthashastra is strong on defensive modes, e.g., forts, and safe
borders, while the Bingfa is
vehement on the need for offensive action.
The
two justly famous texts were products of their times, The Arthashastra
is attributed to about the middle of the second century AD, while the Bingfa is estimated to be from around 500 DC. Traditional thoughts
run deep in civilisational responses. Consequently, they indicate through
the approaches and emphasis of state policies, a deeper and psychological
national preference. The Indian text leans heavily on the defensive while
the Chinese emphasises on the offensive. As Kautilya saw it, the army was
only one amongst seven major elements of the state’s power. He recommended
alliances and coalitions as the means to stabilise the state’s security.
Sunzi saw war as ‘a matter of vital importance to the state . ..“. He
warned the ruler against allowing the state into fighting a protracted war.
Indian
responses to internal and external policy stimuli were a continuation of the
cultural traditions. The initiative on Non-Alignment, the choice of the UN
as a forum to settle the Jammu and Kashmir issue even when it was winning
the war, the restraint in the nuclear weapons field, the initiatives on
MARC, are indicative of the underlying Indian belief in negotiation and
tolerance as the essential element of state policy. The Chinese approach
stands out in contrast. It is of victory by use of force in pursuit of its
objectives, an unwillingness to tolerate dissent in internal policies, of
using protracted wars in other
countries through encouragement to dissident groups and the preference for
demonstrated military strength in its neighbourhood. Arthashastra and Bingfa
provide the clues from the past to the two nation’s policy preferences of
the present., One might even say that China has been the true
“Realist" state and India the “Idealist” in the use of power to
further national interests.
At
the turn of the millennium, the world is changing through information
technology, and economic interdependence. India and China both realise the
need to adapt to these tectonic changes, if they hope to develop as
economically stable and politically lasting entities. The leadership in both
states is aware of the need to ensure the social and economic well-being of
their peoples. In that lies real security and stability, the two essential
conditions for development. They realise that autonomous behaviour in
internal and external relations is no longer feasible in international
arena. The need to assure neighbours of their interests through confidence
building measures, placing ancient disputes in correct perspective, reaching
for consensus instead of conflict resolution by force are the need of the
day. India and China both realise the need for military strength
commensurate with their security and the anxieties of neighbours. The
reality after the Cold War is of a world order based on equity amongst
states and constructive engagement through trade and economic development.
Even as some hegemonic and other similar mindsets are still to be seen, the
future of inter-state relations is well set on the course of cooperation.
China and India realise the need for cooperation and for moving away from
old animosities through mutual agreements. They have resolved to find
solutions to their disputes through negotiations. Indian initiatives in
South Asia and Chinese efforts in finding solutions to its issues of
contention with Russia, Japan, USA and in the Asia Pacific are evidence of
their new awareness. In some ways China is adding a healthy dose of
“Idealist” balance to its policies. India on the other hand is
introducing an element of “Realist” pragmatism to its policies. They are
in the process going beyond the culture constraints of the past. Kautilya
and Sunzi would have both approved of such a reorientation.
In
the military perspective, the best way to remove the prospect of war remains
the removal of the bone of contention. There has never been a better time
than the present to take cooperation between India and China to the levels
they are capable of reaching. The need of the time is to formally and
finally resolve the disputes between the two giant sized states. The
conflicts of the past between China and India were not of nations but
between states following different policies to secure themselves. Now that
the two states are in a better environment of “Realist-Idealist” mix,
specific measures can be looked at. The border dispute should now be
formally and finally settled. This will need accommodation from both sides
and that should not be an insurmountable problem given the new
circumstances. The larger issue of weapons rivalry between the two states
and through either of them into the region is another issue which requires
urgent attention. If these two vexing issues are taken in hand, the way
ahead in the 21st Century would be free from the compulsions of the past and
pave the way to a stable future. If that is achieved, the military
perspective which so dominated the India-China relations in the last 50
years would be balanced by the larger contexts of economy, trade, and
international cooperation. China and India would then be partners in
providing a lead through the principles of Panchsheel and in moving the
world away from military conflicts. It would be a condition which both
Kautilya and Sunzi would have approved.
